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I. INTRODUCTION
Important legal scholars have launched assaults against both the
consequence and legitimacy of international law. These challenges are useful
by way of testing international law's theoretical underpinnings, which, in the
modem period at least, have never been very secure. With The Limits of
InternationalLaw, Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner have done a service to
those who put more faith in international law as a meaningful quantity.'
Especially in these the field's early renaissance years, understandings of
international law should be considerably strengthened by the attack. Though
I doubt the authors would thus conceive of their project, The Limits of
InternationalLaw may ultimately serve the object of their skepticism.2
This is true even before one reaches the matter on the merits. Serious
people do not waste their time on trifles. The fact that the likes of Goldsmith,
Posner, and other respected scholars, along with prominent denizens of think
tanks, the courts, and other policy-oriented institutions, are expending such
efforts by way of refuting the efficacy and/or normativity of international law
is by itself a barometer of its importance. One hardly found their Cold War
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counterparts behind equivalent undertakings; it simply was not worth it, so
obvious was the marginalization of international law in the academy and on the
ground. There is nothing worse than being ignored, and for many decades that
was international law's fate. It might be too self-serving to say that today
international law is the center of the action, academic and otherwise, but the
fact that Goldsmith and Posner have turned their attention to international law,
even as skeptics, is evidence that something important is going on here.
In this respect, their project (here and in other writings, and more or less in
concert with an impressive group of fellow travelers) is a defensive one. As
international law appears to gain traction, it must at all costs be explained
away before entrenchment occurs. No doubt Posner and Goldsmith (though
not always the others) are careful to hide their tracks with respect to any sort
of political agenda, which they may or may not have, but surely the authors of
The Limits of InternationalLaw are skeptical about, if not perhaps hostile to,
international law.3 But that skepticism, shared of course by many others as
part of the modem American tradition of international law exceptionalism, is
itself being stressed. It is becoming increasingly difficult to reconcile a narrow
conception of the place of international law with the broadening swath it is
cutting through all areas of the law at all levels of decision making.
Lest I be mistaken for a breathless internationalist, let me make clear that
I am not advocating international law as some sort of utopian regime.
International law suffers the problems that all legal systems suffer, perhaps
more, insofar as it is a system undergoing radical transformation. Those
problems notwithstanding, it seems time to concede the reality of international
law's greater relative profile and address such challenges (many of them
foundational questions of institutional design) that arise as a result of the
change. Denying the fact of the shift itself seems normatively problematic, a
sort of see-no-evil approach under which the flaws of international legal power
are ignored rather than grappled with. It is unlikely that The Limits of
InternationalLaw will prove the skeptic's Alamo. But it is also unlikely to
shore up the embattled anti-internationalist construct.
Which takes us from the sociology of international law to the merits. The
critical task here is a difficult one; there is a certain slipperiness in the
arguments of The Limits of International Law. Eschewing an openly
dismissive take on international law, Goldsmith and Posner concede what they
must without acknowledging any sort of retreat. The book shrugs in the face
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of undeniable advances in the rule of international law. The primary strategy
is to source those advances to something other than international law itself, or,
more specifically, to something other than conduct undertaken out of a state's
sense of legal obligation. But if Goldsmith and Posner are saying "so what?"
to much of the recent history of international law, one might respond in kind
to their analysis, much of which could apply to law of any stripe, including law
clearly accepted as such. Moreover, Goldsmith and Posner miss much of the
new international law game by restricting their analysis to traditional actors
(namely, states) and traditional issues.
This Essay on The Limits of InternationalLaw will first argue that the
rational interest of states in observing international law does nothing to
diminish its consequence. Other forms of law are also more or less grounded
in the rational action of their target actors, and most of what Goldsmith and
Posner say about international law can be said of quotidian domestic law.
States, as corporate actors, no doubt by and large comply with international
law where it is in their interest to do so; the same can be said of corporations
vis-A-vis domestic law and indeed in many cases of individuals as they
calculate their own conduct. The Essay will then highlight the book's
bracketing of actors other than states. By omitting any serious consideration
of non-state actors from their analysis, Goldsmith and Posner are left with a
partial understanding, at best, of the new international law dynamic. This
bracketing is understandable, as it would be difficult to model the game of
polymorphic actors that results. But NGOs and corporations are now
independently consequential actors in the dynamic of international law, as an
empirical matter, and so international law models must move to take account
of them. Insofar as Goldsmith and Posner brush them aside, their analysis is
at least incomplete.
The Limits of InternationalLaw succeeds at provocation, which is surely
its intention. There is much useful material here, and many of its arguments
are difficult to refute. But ultimately this analysis of international law is
unlikely to carry the day. International law is here to stay, and relative to other
forms of the law is of increasing consequence.

II. THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND ANY OTHER LAW
If Goldsmith and Posner are largely dismissive of international law, they
should be dismissive of other bodies of law as well, for many of their basic
observations apply, more or less, to run-of-the-mine legal systems that the
authors would surely accept as consequential. Compliance with ordinary
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domestic legal regimes often reflects nothing more than the self-interested
behavior of regulated entities. This stands true for individual conduct,
although the compliance of individuals may be overdetermined, involving
moral as well as material incentive structures. But the compliance of other
legal persons, most notably corporations, can be explained entirely in terms of
institutional self-interest. Thus, even if compliance with international law is
amenable only to an interests-based explanation, that does not make it any less
the law, nor does it necessarily bear on issues related to levels of compliance.
In other words, even if Goldsmith and Posner are correct about states acting
out of something other than a sense of legal obligation, international law may
emerge as an increasingly robust regime for regulating the conduct of states
and other actors.
There is something of a strawman in the repeated refrain that states never
abide by international law because they perceive a legal obligation to do so.4
The target is grounded in the customary international law (CIL) rule of opinio
juris, under which the practices of states will not rise to the level of law until
states have acknowledged the practice to be required by international law. But
just because the doctrine includes the formal requirement (to distinguish
customary international law rules from practices reflecting pure coincidence
of interest with no necessary interstate component, such as the judicial use of
res judicata) does not mean that the efficacy of the resulting legal construct is
contingent on that sense of obligation. As the authors acknowledge, the
doctrinal proposition works from the anthropomorphization of states;5 states
do not have feelings, and so cannot act with any particular motivations other
than the motivations of the individuals and entities of which the state is
composed. So the legal premise begins as a fiction. And even if opiniojuris
is an element in the establishment of CIL norms, it is not a necessary
component to compliance with those norms once established.
Goldsmith and Posner themselves acknowledge that state conduct often
comports with international law.6 But they explain away such conformity in
terms other than compliance, most notably as the result of either coincidence
of interest or of coercion. Here is where the analogies to ordinary forms of
domestic law are readily presented. Take the criminal prohibition on murder.
Most people refrain from murder not because the law prohibits it, but rather
because they have no interest in committing it even aside from incentives

4 See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 39, 52, 53, 83.

' Id. at 4-5.
6 Id. at 165.
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created by the law. I do not murder a person that bumps into me on the
sidewalk because I do not have anything to gain by it, and might have a lot to
lose (ruined clothes, the possibility that my victim is actually highly trained in
martial arts and will kill me before I kill him, the distrust of friends and
acquaintances if they learn of the act, etc.), even if I address the proposition
from an entirely amoral perspective. In other words, even if there were no law
against murder, most people would not commit murder; their conduct conforms
with the law, but there is no causal relation between the law and the behavior.
Of course there may be other contexts in which the law plays a
consequential role in an individual's decision not to kill others. Again,
assuming no moral constraints, there will be many scenarios in which (absent
the law) it would be in an individual's interest to commit murder. Competition
for love or money would present only the most obvious. In some cases the
desire to kill would clearly outweigh any nonlegal and even moral incentives
to desist from the conduct. Indeed, it would be the rare human being who has
never fantasized about killing a rival or adversary. Where premeditated,
murder could be undertaken so as to minimize other costs, especially the high
risks otherwise associated with self-defense. But here of course incentives
created by the law and its enforcement make a difference, and (in most cases)
result in the nonoccurrence of the act. Of course, the decision not to commit
murder may be overdetermined, insofar as there will also be strong moral,
social, and other factors reinforcing the legal incentives not to engage in the
conduct. But there surely are many instances in which it is only the law that
stops a person from killing another.7
In such cases, the individual is conforming his behavior to the law not out
of a sense of legal obligation, to use the Goldsmith-Posner refrain, but because
of coercion or the threat thereof. It is the prospect of a twenty-years-to-life
sentence alone that stands in the way of many murders, in which case
conformity to the legal standard is undertaken merely out of rational selfinterest. And yet that explanation for some significant measure of compliance
with the law does not diminish our perception of it as such. This would seem
all the more obvious with respect to certain crimes (mala prohibita) the
punishment of which is not even considered to enjoy moral foundation, as well
as with respect to corporate entities, who can hardly be said to act with moral
motivations as such.'

Such is the assumption of economic perspectives on criminal law. See, e.g., Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Theory of CriminalLaw, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1193 (1985).
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And so the fact that states conform to international law rules out of fear that
they will otherwise face coercion is consistent with a robust legal system.
Goldsmith and Posner's account of CIL includes several examples in which
CIL rules are complied with in the face or wake of coercion. 9 That such
coercion occurs along the dimension of a legal rule, and not in some random
fashion, evidences a regularity associated with law; the law (in all contexts)
presents a line which if crossed presents the possibility of a coercive response.
The book also strategically concedes that states may suffer reputational costs
for treaty violations.'0 The authors note that a reputation for violating treaties
may vary according to type of treaty and that in some cases states may be
served by having a reputation for not complying with international law. But
these observations also have their cognates in the realm of domestic law.
Businesses might be known to have a history of respecting some types of
contractual obligations and not others. Individuals might in certain contexts
benefit from a reputation for not complying with the law, as any casual student
of the mob, or even just the neighborhood bully, would understand."
Of course, international law, and customary international law in particular,
has mostly been enforced on a horizontal basis where ordinary domestic laws
against crimes like murder are typically enforced by a superior institution,
backed if necessary by the legitimized use of violence. That presents the
Austinian argument against the existence of international law as such. And yet
that model seems by now to have been pretty well refuted, unless such
relegation of "law" to pyramidal structures is a matter of taxonomy only. It is
clear that horizontally enforced systems can lead to behavioral regularities
against the immediate self-interest of targeted entities, and that enforcement
in such systems can be undertaken through means other than the use of force.
At the microlevel, there is the law of the queue, enforced among individuals

with treaties to corporate compliance with contracts. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1,
at 105.
9 See, e.g., id. at 50-51 (enforcement through coercion of neutrality rules); id. at 60
(enforcement though coercion of three-mile territorial sea limit); id. at 122 (enforcement through
coercion of human rights norms).
'0 See id. at 102-03. It is this and other unsystematic concessions which make the book's
theory unfalsifiable. See Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 2 (manuscript at 19). The theory
conforms to prevailing conditions on the ground, but can only do so by introducing factors that
themselves are not integral to the theory itself. As others note, for instance, the theory defines
state interests in variable respects in a way that nullifies the utility of rational self-interest.
" For further critique, see Andrew T. Guzman, Reputation and InternationalLaw, 34 GA.
J. INT'L & COMp. L. 379 (2006).
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acting under no authority, textual, legal, or moral. 2 There is by now an
advanced literature on the enforcement of social norms, which, even if not
enjoying3 the force of law, are consequential to rationally self-interested
actors.'
Where legal scholarship has thus recently moved to developing a
continuum of law-including the traditional command-control form of
regulation backed by the police power of the state but, more interestingly,
extending the range to other regimes that systematically affect conduct,
whether of public or private origin, and typically not implicating the use of
force--Goldsmith and Posner seem wed to law/non-law dichotomies. The
model here is limited further insofar as it fails to consider the consequentiality
of norms in the international sphere, whether or not they qualify as law against
formalist criteria." It is almost as if the rope gets pulled up on international
law; now that our metrics of law have broadened, international law is held to
the less generous (and less theoretically interesting) standards of an earlier era.
Indeed, as domestic law scholars explore the uses of nontraditional tools to do
work with respect to which old legal methods have fallen short, international
law should emerge as a field with something to teach. Just because
international law has traditionally employed horizontal mechanisms of
enforcement and just because such enforcement has not always been
consistently backed by the use of force does not necessarily detract from its
salience as a regulator of behavior. And even if the social norms of
international society are not themselves properly characterized as law, they
may well morph into something that is, by way of addressing the possible
pathologies of standards developed and enforced outside of collective public
institutions. 5

See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS (1999).
See, e.g., ERIc A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); ROBERT C. ELuICKSON,
ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out
of the Legal System: Extralegal ContractualRelations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 115 (1992); Richard H. McAdams, GroupsNorms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PENN.
12
13

L. REv. 2237 (1996).

14 See Norman & Trachtman, supra note 2, at 545 ("We might ask, however, whether
CIL
is different in structure from social norms in a domestic context."). The omission is puzzling
given Posner's status as a leading commentator on the relationship of norms and law. See
POSNER, supra note 13.
15 See POSNER, supra note 13, at 219 (arguing that law is better than social
norms systems
because, among other reasons, "[w]here pockets of powerful nonlegal enforcement remain,
people feel uneasy").
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Of course there may be important empirical questions about whether
international law, whatever its thresholds may be, actually reflects conduct on
the ground. Two responses seem possible here. First, no system of law
reflects or achieves perfect behavioral regularity. Even though all societies
criminalize murder, one finds murderers in all societies. 6 Second, most legal
systems include elements that are not enforced at all, or which are not enforced
as written. Domestic law regimes include a host of laws that fall in and out of
desuetude, or the enforcement of which is contingent on temporal or locational
factors; marijuana possession and immigration laws would present two of
many examples. The enforcement of other laws may not match their literal
terms, as in the case of roadway speed limits. Finally, the transaction costs of
legal proceedings may pose a formidable barrier to bringing to bear the power
of the state against noncompliers. The result is that all sorts of infractions
(whether of public law or, perhaps even more notoriously, of private
contractual obligations) go underenforced. And yet none of these deficiencies
in domestic law systems give rise to any doubts about its overall efficacy.
And so highlighting non-conformity with international law rules is not
enough by itself to refute their significance. International law does not enjoy
perfect compliance, but nor does any other legal regime. Just because there are
some governments (a dwindling number, one might add) that engage in torture
does not mean that the international law norm prohibiting the practice is of no
consequence. Just because Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter has not
ended the use of force does not rule out the possibility that, as with 65 m.p.h.
speed limits, the provision has in fact constrained the use of force, at least at
the margins;' 7 and even if the ban has had no effect on state behavior, it would
not cast the whole international legal system into doubt. Of course, there will
be some level of noncompliance at which such universal doubts would emerge;
if I decided tomorrow to enact a system of law to which no one paid the
attention, it would not be law just because I called it law. But that is an
empirical case that Goldsmith and Posner have failed to make in anything more
than an anecdotal fashion, and I suspect that they could not make the case if

16 Goldsmith and Posner assert that "[d]omestic law is enforced in well-ordered societies,"

whereas "international law is not reliably enforced." GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at
195. These are empirical observations unsupported by data. Even homicide laws are not
enforced with any particular reliability; murder cases had only a 64% clearance rate in the United
States in 2002. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/
cleared.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2006).
"7But see Michael J. Glennon, How InternationalRules Die, 93 GEO. L.J. 939 (2005)
(arguing that excessive violation of rule leads to complete freedom of action).
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they attempted to do so systematically. It is also worth noting here that the
coverage of international law has broadened in recent decades-something that
anti-internationalists have generally decried, at least with respect to the rise of
international human rights-which surely bears on the significance of
international law generally, in much the same way that federal law has become
more important as its substantive scope has extended to new fields.
Indeed, The Limits ofInternationalLaw (in another concession) appears to
recognize that the trendline points to increased conformity with international
law rules. Thus Goldsmith and Posner acknowledge that human rights have
improved on a global basis. Here, too, they dismiss the significance of
international law as a causal factor, explaining the phenomenon in other terms,
economic (increasing prosperity) and political (the fall of the Soviet Union).18
Leaving aside the rather glaring failure to contemplate the contribution of the
hardening of human rights norms to the end of Communism, this line also fails
to distinguish international law from domestic law. No doubt, the expansion
of rights in the domestic context has been facilitated by rising standards of
living as well as by political factors, and yet that circumstance has not been
typically deployed to deny some role for law in the process. Perhaps it would
be possible, then, to argue that law has in fact been epiphenomenal to the
domestic expansion of rights, and a similar analysis might apply at the
international level, but the point once again is that international law does not
seem exceptional along this dimension. The law is unlikely ever to change
anything by itself, but in that respect as well, international law is no different
from its domestic equivalents.
At best, then, the focus of Goldsmith and Posner' s critique is narrower than
their tone would suggest. The bottom line is not that international law is not
law (as they are careful to acknowledge in yet another concession). 9 My point
above is that international law is in fact not categorically distinct from other
forms of law. The book is left taking its shots not against international law as
such, but rather against those legal scholars who assert that states comply with
international law out of a sense of legal obligation. It is true that the work of
some notable scholars can be taken as saying as much, for example, those of
the transnational legal process school. But even there the point is not as sharp
as it might seem, nor necessarily distinctive of international law.
Transnational legal process supposes an internalization of international law
norms through iterative interactions in and through which international law

18 GOLDSMIH
19 Id. at 225.

& POSNER, supra note 1, at 121.
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emerges as a material quantity." I think that transnational legal process theory
has a difficult time explaining why international law gains traction at any
particular point in time, and believe the model (along with the sibling
constructivist school of international relations theory) may be flawed insofar
as it fails to take interests into account.2' But the internalization phenomenon
seems once again relatively easily demonstrated from parallel sequences in the
domestic context. Corporate compliance with domestic law may mostly be a
matter of calculated rational self-interest, but it may well be the case that many
corporate officials would nonetheless conceive of such compliance as
generated at least in part out of a sense of legal obligation. I would agree that
this conception of compliance probably does not amount to much more than
window dressing for the interest-based calculations, although it could tie in to
the reputational consequences of lawbreaking for repeat players. But that
again would not detract from the force of the law as such. If the only thing
Goldsmith and Posner are taking down here is one among many conceptions
of international law, the work is less ambitious than one takes away from a
first read, as international law may well be sustainable on other accounts.
l]H. THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, NON-STATE ACTORS
SUBTRACTED

The bracketing of non-state actors presents perhaps a more serious flaw in
this work. The proposition that states do not conform to international legal
standards out of a sense of obligation may be accurate, even if it is a less
interesting proposition than the authors make it out to be. But the model's
state-centric premises undercut any remaining utility. The analysis may work
when applied to the old world in which states dominated the international
scene, and were, with few exceptions, the holders of all international power,
legal and actual. In the contemporary world, non-state actors are in some
contexts autonomous agents, and their independent powers are growing larger.
These actors pose a tremendous challenge to the doctrine and theory of
international law and international relations, and any model that fails to
account for these new players will enjoy only limited application going
forward.

20 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing InternationalLaw Home, 35 Hous. L. REV. 623,

643 (1998).

2 See Peter J. Spiro, Disaggregating U.S. Interests in International Law, 67 LAW &

CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 (2004).
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The Limits ofInternationalLaw attempts tojustify this omission, and then,
apparently understanding the omission to be too glaring in the context of
international human rights, attempts to explain away the role at least of
nongovernmental organizations. The justification: "[I]ntemational law
addresses itself to states and, for the most part, not to individuals or other
entities such as governments." 22 This is an odd move coming from scholars
who otherwise vaunt international power over international law; Goldsmith
and Posner are not otherwise inclined to accept international law shibboleths,
and yet here they do exactly that. If actors other than states in fact garner
power on the ground, then international law's blind eyes should not supply an
excuse for others to ignore those realities. The rationale, moreover, does not
really even work on its own terms, as international law itself begins to take
notice of actors other than states.23 On this score, then, even from an
interests/power perspective, international law appears to be ahead of the
authors' own game.
The nearly exclusive focus on state behavior and interaction explains the
choice of case studies for the analysis of customary international law.
Neutrality, the breadth of the territorial sea, ambassadorial immunity, and
prize: while enjoying "prominence,"24 at least three of the four (the territorial
sea excluded) are musty old rules of little contemporary relevance or interest.
They do a lot of work for Goldsmith and Posner, insofar as they more readily
fit within simple games and were a matter of bilateral rather than
multilateralized relations; these case studies lend themselves to the sort of
stylized model that drives the book's central conclusions. Insofar as
international relations, in those contexts and in many others, was mostly about
relations between states, perhaps Goldsmith and Posner's applications have
something to tell us about the evolution of traditional customary norms. But
query whether they have much to teach about what is going on today. There
appears to be, in other words, a serious selection error in the authors' dataset.
Far more useful-and difficult-would have been the application of their
theory to more modem examples of custom. And yet those examples would
perhaps have provided a less seamless fit, insofar as the dynamic may involve
international organizations, transnational corporations, and nongovernmental
organizations. Perhaps the authors could prove me wrong, but the analysis

22 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra
23

note 1, at 5.

See, e.g., NON-STATE ACTORS AS NEW SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rainer

Hofmann ed., 1998).
24 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 45.
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would be more persuasive on its face if it centered something other than
antiquarian rules of the century before last.
When it comes to human rights, however, The Limits ofInternationalLaw
cannot credibly ignore nongovernmental organizations, so prominent have they
become in that arena.25 But it nonetheless attempts to brush NGOs aside, I
believe unconvincingly. First, Goldsmith and Posner make the "nothing new"
feint. This strategy, perhaps the best extended example of which is Stephen
Krasner's Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, seeks to rebut assertions of
change by highlighting historical examples of the putatively new phenomenon.
In Krasner's case, the project is to dispel arguments that sovereignty is in
decline by trotting out the many ways in which sovereignty never amounted to
a perfect edifice; in other words, sovereignty has always been leaky, and so the
fact that it is also leaky now is uninteresting.26 Goldsmith and Posner do this
on a more limited scale in this context by noting historical examples of NGO
influence, such as in efforts to end the slave trade. 27 But of course very few
phenomena magically emerge without antecedents, and this case proves no

Posner elsewhere dismisses NGOs as a force in the international legal arena, because "it
is only in the context of human rights that the NGO theory has surface plausibility." Eric A.
Posner, InternationalLaw andthe DisaggregatedState, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 797, 816 (2005).
That assertion ignores the clear possibility that NGOs are consequential players in, for instance,
international environmental and intellectual property law. See, e.g., THOMAS PRINCEN &
MATTHIAS FINGER, ENVIRONMENTAL NGOs IN WORLD PoLmcs: LINKING THE LOCAL AND THE
GLOBAL (1994); Kal Raustiala, States, NGOs, and InternationalEnvironmentalInstitutions,41
INT'L STUD. Q. 719 (1997); Susan K. Sell, MultinationalCorporationsas Agents of Change:
The GlobalizationofIntellectualPropertyRights, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS 169 (A. Claire Cutler et al. eds., 1999). In any case, human rights represents perhaps
the most important growth area in international law. Even if NGOs influenced only human
rights, it would bear analysisjust as one would not dismiss the importance ofthe American Civil
Liberties Union and other domestic NGOs insofar as their legal influence is limited to civil
liberties and individual rights. Posner also notes that NGOs may not be active in all areas of
international law; for example, "[t]here are no comparable NGOs that monitor compliance with
the law of consular relations." POSNER, supra, at 816. Once again, that is incorrect as a factual
matter; there is a vigorous NGO presence on the question of consular notification requirements
under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. See, e.g., Amnesty
International, USA: Another "Double Standard" on ConsularRights?, Mar. 10, 2005, http://
web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engAMR510502005?open&of=ENG-USA. Moreover, the fact
that some areas of international law are not of concern to NGOs does not diminish their salience
in areas in which they are engaged, in the same way that the importance of domestic public
interest groups is hardly diminished by their nonpresence on questions relating to, say,
enforcement of the Appointments Clause.
26 See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999).
27

See GOLDSMrrITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 125.
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exception. The fact of historical continuities does not preclude the possibility
of periodization. NGO activity in human rights has broadened in scope and
participation, and has been largely transnationalized, whereas earlier NGO
activity was undertaken almost exclusively along national lines. In those
respects, the intuition that something new is going on here would seem
sustainable.
Goldsmith and Posner also attempt to dismiss NGO activity as about
something other than law. "It is the moral quality of the abusive acts," they
argue, "not their legal quality, that leads to [NGO] human rights criticism.""
The claim appears to be founded on the fact that NGOs will assert human
rights treaty norms against states that are not parties to the relevant regimes.
But even a casual glance at the websites and publications of the major
international human rights groups shows serious attention to and guidance
from international legal standards. Of course, NGOs are playing the role of
advocates here, and so their claims will seek to press the envelope. In some
cases pressing that envelope will incrementally contribute to changes in the
law.29 Human rights activism is notjust or even primarily about moral outrage;
increasingly, it is about legal advocacy. In this sense, it very much has
"depended in [a] special way on international law." 30 International law, even
as asserted in an aggressive yet credible fashion (including the assertion of
treaty-generated norms against non-parties, by way of the late-modern
phenomenon of instant custom 31 ), gives human rights NGOs a legitimacy they
would not enjoy were they arguing the merely moral. Others are better
positioned to argue morality (religious institutions, for example), where the

28

Id.

29 For an interesting model of NGO participation in human rights norm creation, see ANNEMARIE CLARK, DIPLOMACY OF CONSCIENCE: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND CHANGING HUMAN

RIGHTS NORMS (2001).
30 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 125.
"' Or even not-so-instant custom. Goldsmith and Posner argue that the abandonment of
torture as a state practice in Uruguay and Paraguay demonstrates the inconsequence of
international law, because Uruguay had acceded to relevant human rights treaties where
Paraguay had not; human rights law could not, in their view, thus explain the changed state
conduct. Id. at 122. This account, however, does not consider that norms against torture had
by that time been incorporated into customary international law, and could thus be brought to
bear as a matter of international law against governments, even where they had failed to accept
the legal obligation through treaty mechanisms. It is likewise clear (to dispatch Goldsmith and
Posner's other such example) that international pressure against Argentina to desist from
"disappearing" citizens in the 1970s and 1980s was framed as a matter of international law,
Argentina's nonparticipation in formal human rights regimes notwithstanding.
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law empowers in ostensibly neutral terms. We see the same dynamic in the
domestic arena; in much the same fashion as domestic civil-rights NGOs will
argue the law even if they may also be driven by moral motivations,
international human rights NGOs use the law as a tool to advance their agenda,
often quite successfully.
That success raises the question of non-state power. Although Goldsmith
and Posner do not appear directly to confront this question, there is heavy
implication here that NGOs merit consideration only insofar as their rhetoric
and "moral commitments" translate into "domestic political pressure or
pressure imposed by powerful foreign states," and that, again, any resulting
changes in the behavior of states owe nothing to international law.32 But law
in and of itself is never self-enforcing; law requires individuals to give it force.
And it is not clear why (along the lines described above) law has to happen
through the channel of legal institutions. As long as there is some level of
causal conformity between behavior and the law, the mechanism of
enforcement would seem irrelevant. If NGO advocacy is framed in legal
terms, responsiveness among individuals and states to that advocacy should
count as responsiveness to law.
Moreover, it is not clear that the premise of the two-level game continues
to hold on the ground. NGO activity is not just about working through
domestic channels to influence governments, so that they will in turn bring
pressure to bear on offending states. Rather, the game has become
increasingly transnationalized, so that NGOs hardly restrict themselves to their
"home" governments, insofar as they can continue to be identified with any
single state in the first place. Rather, NGOs will work all channels, attempting
to advance their influence where they can, with multiple governments, in many
cases with the offending states themselves.
The interesting question here is why NGO advocacy has any traction in
changing the behavior of states and other actors, especially where it falls
outside the domestic political framework. It could be the force of their ideas,
in themselves and as translated into law. This is the answer of the
constructivists. Ideas matter, and at some tipping point-resulting in a norm
cascade-states perceive conformity with certain standards as a necessary
element in their identity as states.3 3 The problem with the constructivist
paradigm is that it fails to explain why certain ideas gain hold at certain times,
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Id. at 124-25.

"3 See, e.g., Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, InternationalNorm Dynamics and
PoliticalChange, 52 INT'L ORG. 887 (1998).
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why, for instance, the transnational human rights advocacy campaigns against
repressive Latin American regimes (a model-making example for the
constructivists34 ) succeeded when they did.
On this score, I share Goldsmith and Posner's apparent skepticism that
ideas by themselves will drive change among international actors.35 But even
36
if one accepts interest-based explanations of the new international dynamic,
NGOs are an-important part of the picture, most evidently the large human
rights groups, but also including those representing non-state communities of
various descriptions.3 7 NGOs now marshal power, backed by the sympathetic
constituencies that they represent. In the face of dramatically multiplied
transnational connection points, these constituencies can be mobilized against
international actors of almost every description. With the ever-narrowing
exception of truly retrograde political regimes (North Korea presenting
perhaps the only obvious persistent example), governments now understand
that such transnational networks can cause them material injury, most
obviously by pulling the strings of the globalized economy. When NGOs talk,
their constituencies listen and act; a government out of step with human rights
norms now has to be concerned, at least, that NGO mobilization will result in
lost trade and investment, with the attendant possibilities for destabilization.
That is by no means to say that all states will cower before the demands ofjust
any NGO. But it is by now clear that rational actor bad guys will have reason

34 See MARGARET E. KECK & KATHYRN SIKKINK, AcTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS 79-120
(1998).
3 See Spiro, supra note 21.
36 As Hathaway and Lavinbuk note, "Revisionism may need rationalism, but rationalism
does not need revisionism." Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 2 (manuscript at 16). Among
the contributions to this symposium, those by Andrew Guzman and Kal Raustiala also use
rational actor premises on the way to establishing a more robust international legal system than
Goldsmith and Posner suggest, as do Greg Norman and Joel Trachtman in their important
critique of the Goldsmith/Posner CIL model. Guzman, supra note 11; Kal Raustiala, Refining

The Limits of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L& COMP. L. 423 (2006); Norman & Trachtman,
supranote 2. Raustiala notes the role of private actors, but primarily as domestic constituencies
working to influence state behavior. Otherwise, these critiques all apply a rationalist approach
to a game in which states alone count as players.
37 See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 109. Here one finds a related concession on
Goldsmith and Posner's part, namely that citizens of states will care enough about co-religionists
and co-ethnics located outside the state to motivate human rights initiatives on the part of the
state. See id. This may or may not be consistent with rational choice-based IR theory; in any
case, it is not clear why the observation should be limited to co-religionists and co-ethnics-why
not the elderly, environmentalists, gays, children, the disabled, women, indigenous peoples, and
other identity groups, all of whom are now organizing on a transnational basis?
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to be responsive to the demands of NGOs in some cases, or ignore them at
their peril.
This incidentally gives the lie to a recurring theme of The Limits of
InternationalLaw, namely, that states are unlikely to put much on the line
towards enforcing human rights norms in other states. From a simple rational
choice perspective, it does not make much sense for states to expend
significant resources where the payoff is low. (The observation would
presumably apply with respect to the enforcement of any norm a violation of
which poses low or diffuse costs outside the territory of the non-compliant
state.) One can accept that proposition-and it is no doubt true that state
enforcement of human rights regimes has been spotty at best, even with respect
to egregious violations-and yet wonder if the picture it gives is not so
incomplete as to be of very limited utility. Non-state actors are willing to
expend sometimes quite substantial resources on monitoring and enforcing
human rights norms, and they are sometimes (though not always) in a position
to enhance compliance without assistance from other states. If non-state actors
are now a part of international lawmaking and enforcement, as an empirical
matter, they should have a place in the equation. Including them as
independently consequential players would require a more complex model,
perhaps exceedingly so (again, the two-level solution, in which non-state
actors qualify as "domestic" actors, would no longer conform to the nature of
their actual participation). The complexity would seem especially daunting
insofar as the actors here are nonisomorphic entities of widely variable
definition and capacity, pursuing qualitatively variable objectives.
The task becomes all the more challenging still once one confronts those
contexts in which states get cut out of the picture altogether. As international
law increasingly addresses such issues as human rights and the environment
rather than matters of traditional state-to-state relations (such as those
considered in Goldsmith and Posner's case studies), there may be international
norms that evolve, at least in part, through the interaction of non-state actors
with each other, with no necessary role for the state.38 This is true, most

31 See, e.g., JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX oFANERICANPOWER 106 (2002) (describing
"de facto governance" that results from interactions of non-state actors); John Gerard Ruggie,
Reconstituting the Global Public Domain- Issues,Actors, and Practices,10 EuR. J. INT'L REL.
499 (2004). There is also the growing role of such non-state actors as the International
Organization for Standardization in global coordination games. Where Goldsmith and Posner
assume that states solve coordination problems among themselves, see GOLDsMrrH & POSNER,
supranote 1, at 38, in fact it is now more often private transnational firms rather than states that
drive technical standards setting, acting not through states but in an unmediated fashion among
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notably, where corporate actors are the ultimate target of norm regimes. As
offshoring diminishes state capacities to regulate corporate conduct, NGOs
have devised mechanisms beyond traditional, public regulation by way of
advancing agendas aimed at corporate behavior. NGOs can cause material
harm to corporations, even more than to states; negative publicity from
prominent organizations can take away from the bottom line. Hence the
evident willingness on the part of corporations to come to the table with NGOs
on workplace and other rights-related issues (respecting for example minimum
wages, child labor, and health and safety issues), the result of which in turn has
been the creation of increasingly refined codes of conduct.39
Goldsmith and Posner would no doubt argue that whatever the significance
of this activity, it is not law. But that would seem to be a formalist
dodge-unsatisfying to anyone interested in the exercise of real power and the
calculation of concrete interests-around the emergence of regimes that
facilitate the creation and entrenchment of behavioral regularities on the
ground. There is no institutional logic that precludes conceiving of these
regimes as a form of law. The standards otherwise work against the interests
of target entities, if not for the coercive powers of the enforcers. Human rights
and labor rights groups, among others, may not have armies at their disposal,
but they do have the capacity to monitor, and where necessary to inflict
damage on profits and goodwill. Moreover, insofar as these regimes are
codified and enjoy institutional homes, they cannot be dismissed as mere social
norms, even assuming that were a persuasive analytical response to their
emergence.
This is by no means intended to idealize these processes, NGOs, or nonstate actors generally, which may be highly problematic along basic
transparency and accountability metrics.'
But it suggests their
consequentiality, with which international legal theorists are appropriately
grappling in matters of institutional design. And yet the Goldsmith-Posner
perspective offers no insights into that phenomenon. Parsimony is a virtue in
modeling, but only where it does not appreciably scale back a model's
applicability. Goldsmith and Posner's analysis may be well taken as far as it
goes, but in the wake of changing circumstances on the ground it may not go
themselves and through the market. See Liora Salter, The StandardsRegime for Communication
andInfornation Technologies, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONALAFFAIRS, supranote

25, at 97.
39 See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Taking MultilateralCorporateCodes of Conduct to the Next
Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389 (2005).
o See Peter J. Spiro, Accountingfor NGOs, 3 C1. J. INT'L L. 161 (2002).
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very far. As the action shifts from traditional interstate relations to a
polycentric dynamic involving a spectrum of entities, a smaller slice of
international law and relations will be amenable to their explanations.

The Limits ofInternationalLaw is a book more appropriate to another era.
If it had been published, say, thirty years ago, it would have been far more
difficult to take issue with its tone and conclusions, for that was a world in
which international law was in fact a feeble quantity. But the likes of
Goldsmith and Posner would not then have bothered to write this book. Only
now that international law appears to be a growing force does it become
necessary for the skeptics to mobilize. While Goldsmith and Posner may
effectively recall the weakness of traditional international law constructs, the
book does not even begin to address the new dynamic of international
lawmaking. Responding to Goldsmith, Posner, and their fellow travellers may
prove a detour from the project of unpacking that new dynamic and the
challenges it presents. In the end, however, that project is likely to occupy
international legal scholars through the coming generation, which will itself,
perhaps, refute the central conclusions of The Limits of InternationalLaw.

